Evidence for the long-term effects of foreign aid on local communities is mixed. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether external subsidies, e.g. foreign assistance, promote or undermine giving. Subjects play two rounds of a dictator game followed by an elicitation of norms. In both rounds, leaders allocate earned endowments to passive recipients. With a between-subject design, we vary the presence of a subsidy and compare wealth redistribution to public good provision. We find that subsidizing public good provision increases giving, while subsidizing wealth redistribution does not. Furthermore, subsidies do not undermine giving or norms about giving in the long-term.
Introduction
In many developing nations, political institutions that establish the rule of law and maintain social order are often weak or nonexistent. Consequences of such politically insecure environments include economic stagnation, intrastate conflict, and amoral familism. Economic transfers from one country or organization to another country-what we refer to as foreign aid-are common tools used by the international community to combat these outcomes and foster economic, social, and political development.
The extent to which foreign aid accomplishes these development goals, however, is open to debate. Economists have struggled to reach a consensus regarding the effects of foreign aid on local economies. Some suggest that foreign aid is effective in spurring economic growth (Arndt, 2015; Arndt et al., 2010; Brückner, 2013; Clemens et al., 2012; Juselius et al., 2014; Minoiu and Reddy, 2010) , while others suggest that foreign aid undermines growth (Easterly et al., 2004; Mosley et al., 1987) or that foreign aid fosters income inequality and further skews income distributions in developing nations (Bjørnskov, 2010; Boone, 1996; Chong et al., 2009 ).
Literatures tackling the effects of foreign aid on social and political development are equally divergent. In economics and political science, a prevailing school of thought is that foreign aid undermines local governance (Booth, 2011; Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 2001 Easterly, , 2006 Easterly and Pfutze, 2008; Moss et al., 2008; Moyo, 2009; Rajan and Subramanian, 2007) . External subsidies weaken incentives intended to address collective action problems concerned with the provision of public goods for community members (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Morrison, 2007 Morrison, , 2009 ). Yet, the empirical literature, which heavily relies on observational data, has found negative (Busse and Gröning, 2009; Djankov et al. 2008; Nielson et al., 2011) , positive (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Jones and Tarp, 2016; Tavares, 2003; Wright, 2009) , and null (Knack, 2004) effects of aid on political institutions. 1 In a sobering review, Wright and Winters (2010) recently acknowledged the current state of the literature: "This research agenda has in many ways stalled amid criticism related to poor identification, self-inflicted endogeneity, and the general limitations of cross-country growth 1 The empirical evidence surrounding the efficacy of development aid projects aimed at improving social and economic conditions in conflict settings is similarly mixed. Some studies find that aid projects decrease violence (Berman et al., 2011) and increase the legitimacy of the state (Böhnke and Zürcher, 2013) , others find no effect (Chou, 2012) , and yet other research suggests that aid can increase rates of political violence (Crost et al., 2014 , Nunn and Qian, 2014 , Sexton, 2016 regressions (p. 62)." Moreover, there has been a growing trend in international development to move away from unconditional government-to-government aid transfers (Dietrich, 2013) . Many international donor organizations now try to target non-state actors and local-level projects to varying degrees (Dietrich and Wright, 2015) . The World Bank's development efforts, for instance, are not exclusively directed at central governments or state elites (Fengler and Kharas, 2011) .
Instead, their focus is also on fostering development projects within communities and distributing aid directly to non-state actors and community leaders. In fact, much of the foreign aid delivered by the U.S. in recent years is in the form of local-level development projects specifically targeting war-torn parts of Afghanistan and Iraq (Beath, et al., 2013; Berman et al., 2013 , Karell, 2017 For these two reasons-issues of poor identification and a turn to local development projects-we employ a research design that tests possible channels through which external transfers and subsidies, such as foreign aid, might affect behavior and institutions at the local level (Moyo, 2009; Orock, 2015) . We ask four main questions: (1) Do subsidies improve the quality of services community leaders and elites provide to community members? (2) Does the answer to the first question depend on the type of service provided? That is, do leaders share subsidies in the same way-or at all-under conditions of wealth distribution versus public good provision? (3) Since foreign aid is rarely permanent, what are the long-term effects of subsidies? In other words, do leaders alter their behavior once a subsidy is removed? And (4) do subsidies pose unintended consequences for the community? More specifically, do subsidies undermine norms about giving and is the strength of these norms dependent on the services leaders provide to community members?
To answer these questions, we implemented a community-level foreign aid setting in a laboratory experiment with undergraduate students from a large public university. Our experiment consisted of subjects playing two rounds of a dictator game. At the start of the experiment, subjects were randomly paired with another participant. For each pair, a leader and a passive recipient were randomly determined. In round one, leaders completed a computerized real-effort task (Gill and Prowse, 2012) and freely divided earned tokens between themselves and the recipient. In round two, leaders completed another computerized real-effort task and allocated tokens to different randomly selected recipients.
2 After round two but before seeing endowments, leaders and recipients completed a norm-elicitation task (Krupka and Weber, 2013) to measure subjects'
normative judgments of what constitutes appropriate leader behavior.
With this baseline between-subject design, we manipulated two variables consisting of two levels each: subsidy, which varied the magnitude of a piece-rate; and relative price of giving, which varied the magnitude of a multiplier. For the subsidy variable, in the control condition leaders earned two community tokens for each unit of effort, while in the treatment condition leaders earned an additional private token for each unit of effort. Community tokens could be shared with recipients; private tokens could not and were given to leaders as "compensation for performing the effort task." Piece-rate subsidies were introduced in round one and then removed in round two.
For the relative price of giving variable, community tokens allocated to recipients were multiplied by 2 (a 1:2 ratio) in the treatment condition, while community tokens allocated to recipients in the control condition were multiplied by 1 (a 1:1 ratio). We treat the multiplier of 1 as an operationalization of wealth distribution, and the multiplier of 2 as an operationalization of public good provision.
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Our experiment yields three major discoveries. First, we find that subsidizing wealth distribution does not increase benefits for recipients. Leaders do not share the benefits of a subsidy with community members under conditions of wealth distribution. In contrast, we find that subsidizing public good provision significantly increases community welfare: the benefits of a subsidy are effectively passed on to recipients through greater sharing by leaders. In the absence of a subsidy, there is no difference between the two contexts in terms of community welfare or overall efficiency (i.e. leaders underprovide the public good). Subsidies, then, are essential to uncovering the welfare-enhancing effects of public good provision.
Second, we find that the introduction (round one) and then removal (round two) of a subsidy does not alter or change the behavior of community leaders. Leaders who were subsidized in round 1 and then unsubsidized in round 2 generate rates of giving similar to those leaders who were never subsidized. Regardless of the conditions-be it wealth distribution or public good 2 Erkal et al. (2011) also explore real-effort tasks and giving behavior in the lab. Their main result is that the highest-earning subject is generally not the most generous one. This is attributed to a selection effect. We abstract from selection effects in our design, as leaders are determined exogenously. 3 We treat the multiplier of 2 as public good provision since giving under these conditions increases the total amount of tokens in the community at some cost to the leader. Alternatively, one can interpret the multiplier as a measure of the worthiness of a recipient (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Fong, 2007) .
provision-the removal of a subsidy therefore does not undermine community welfare in the long run. Third, we find that subsidies also do not undermine norms about the socially appropriate allocation of resources. In fact, norms of giving are equivalent across the four conditions, are shared by both leaders and recipients, and achieve consensus under most conditions (e.g., 50-50 even split). Norms of giving, however, do not parallel behavior: the median share of tokens transferred from leaders to passive recipients is 20% (or equivalently a 40-10 split in favor of leaders), which is viewed as socially inappropriate by most recipients and leaders.
By placing a premium on causal identification and internal validity, we are able to adjudicate between the mixed findings observed in the development literature. If leaders face conditions conducive to the provision of public goods, then leaders effectively transfer external subsidies to community members (see Gomanee et al., 2005; Osei et al., 2005) . But if leaders face conditions conducive to wealth distribution, then our findings suggest that subsidies contribute to income inequality: community leaders do not distribute unconditional private transfers to community members, thereby restricting the benefits of external subsidies to community leaders and local elites (see Bjørnskov, 2010; Boone, 1996; Chong et al., 2009; Olken, 2007; Reinikka and Svensson, 2000) . Finally, if subsidies are volatile and unstable, then leaders do not give less in order to avoid a reduction in the amount of tokens earned relative to what they experienced in the past. That is, leaders do not alter their giving behavior in reaction to the removal of a subsidy.
This suggests that the intrastate conflict and strife produced by foreign aid shocks might not result from changes in leader behavior but from a reduction in the goods and services foreign aid subsidizes (see Agenor and Aizenman, 2010; Eifert and Gelb, 2005; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000) .
Taken together, our results are best interpreted in light of prior observational research with high external validity.
We thus conclude that subsidies significantly increase community welfare if and only if leaders are under conditions of public good provision, and that subsidies do not undermine community welfare or norms about giving in the long-term. The remaining paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of our experimental procedures, including a description of the real-effort task, dictator game, manipulated variables, norm-elicitation task, and demographic questionnaire. Section 3 reviews the main results, while Section 4-the conclusionsummarizes our main findings, reviews implications and directions for future research, and highlights the strengths (internal validity) and weaknesses (external validity) of our study.
Experiment
Our experimental game captures two central components for examining the effects of external transfers on local institutions: (1) leaders have complete discretion on how to distribute received transfers, and (2) transfers are temporary. The first assumption allows for the possibility that external transfers fail to increase community welfare because local leaders retain the transfers for themselves and their close supporters -a finding that is common in the foreign aid literature (Olken, 2007; Reinikka and Svensson, 2000) . The second assumption allows us to explore the long-run effects of volatile external transfers: Do leaders uphold community welfare if foreign aid is reduced? This second assumption is important given the proposition that foreign aid fosters economic and political development in the short-term but undercuts these developmental gains in the long-term once foreign aid is removed (Agenor and Aizeman, 2010; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000; Nielson et al., 2011) .
Design
The game proceeded in two stages, stage A and stage B. In both stages, subjects were matched into pairs and played a version of the dictator game. In our context, one subject, called the leader, decided how much of the available surplus he or she wanted to give to another subject, called the recipient. Recipients did not make decisions and were thus passive participants of the game. The dictator game was designed to examine whether rational actors would seize an entire surplus if given a chance. A robust result in experimental economics is that many subjects who play the dictator game do not seize the entire surplus and are willing to share it with others (see e.g., Forsythe et al., 1994) .
Note that our experimental setting differs from the standard dictator game in a number of important respects. First, as mentioned above, surplus allocation is determined by leaders over two stages. This allows us to study how the removal of external transfers affects behavior. Second, the leaders face a pure redistribution problem under some treatment conditions (i.e., the recipient receives one token for each token the leader chooses to give), while under other treatment conditions each token the leader gives to a recipient is multiplied by two (Andreoni and Miller, 2002) . This allows us to examine how external transfers affect behavior under different sets of conditions. Third, we introduce an additional asymmetry between the leader and the recipient: the surplus available for distribution is generated by the leader in a real-effort task (Gill and Prowse, 2012) . The task consists of 48 sliders ranging from 0 to 100. Leaders are given 120 seconds to position as many sliders as possible at 50 (the initial position of each slider is random). Each correctly positioned slider generates a certain number of tokens (each worth $0.20 USD) depending on the manipulation. We implement the real-effort task to underscore leaders and their role: leaders decide how to allocate surplus within the community; given their social positions, they are expected to provide distributive services to community members. From an experimental design perspective, the slider task does not exhibit strong learning effects. 4 A subject's ability to generate tokens is thus comparable across stages.
[ Insert Figure 1 About Here ] Figure 1 depicts the timeline and design of the experiment. After subjects read the instructions and correctly answered a set of control questions, the experiment started with a practice round of the real-effort slider task. The goal of the practice round was to further mitigate potential learning effects that might occur from stage A to stage B. Upon completion of the practice round, subjects were randomly assigned to either a leader or passive recipient role. Roles stayed fixed throughout the experiment. In both stages, leaders generated tokens during the slider task and then distributed tokens between themselves and recipients. Finally, leaders and recipients completed a norm-elicitation task to measure normative judgments of what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate leader behavior (see Krupka and Weber, 2013) . That is, we asked subjects about the "socially appropriate" amount of tokens a leader should transfer to a recipient. At the start, subjects were told that the experiment consisted of different parts, but were not informed about the specific details of each part at that point in the study.
With this basic experimental framework, we manipulated two variables consisting of two levels each, yielding a 2 × 2 between-subject factorial design. The first variable, relative price of giving, varied the magnitude of a multiplier. We manipulated two values of the multiplier: 1 or 2.
If the multiplier was 1, each token the leader allocated to recipients was worth one 1 token to the recipient. If the multiplier was 2, each token the leader allocated to recipients was doubled and worth 2 tokens to the recipient. We treat the multiplier of 1 as an operationalization of pure wealth distribution, and the multiplier of 2 as an operationalization of public good provision. The second 4 Gill and Prowse (2012) show that over ten rounds of the slider task the average number of correctly positioned sliders increased from 22.2 to 26.3. They also test whether higher monetary incentives lead to a larger number of correctly positioned sliders and find a small positive effect. However, in all cases they found average scores between 22 and 26. In our experiment, the average number of correctly positioned sliders was between 19 and 23 in stage A and between 21 and 24 in stage B. These numbers indicate that the incentives and abilities in the slider task were comparable across stages and conditions. variable, subsidy, varied the presence or absence of an external subsidy. In the control condition, each correctly positioned slider yielded 2 tokens. This occurred in stage A and stage B as well as under both relative price of giving conditions (i.e., multiplier of 1 and 2). We refer to this baseline control condition as a piece-rate of 2. In the treatment condition, leaders earned an additional token for each correctly positioned slider (a piece-rate of 3). This additional token was introduced in stage A and then removed in stage B. In other words, each correctly positioned slider generated 3 tokens in stage A and 2 tokens in stage B. The extra token earned in stage A can be interpreted as an external transfer or subsidy. In sum, our design yields four experimental conditions: NET1
(no external transfer and a multiplier of 1), ET1 (external transfer and a multiplier of 1), NET2 (no external transfer and a multiplier of 2), and ET2 (external transfer and a multiplier of 2).
Because our goal was to create a situation in which leaders perceived them as such, we did not use neutral language. The instructions described the situation as we do in the present manuscript, referring to the different roles as leaders and recipients. The two tokens earned per slider in each game were referred to as community tokens. We told subjects that leaders could freely distribute these tokens. In the presence of external transfers when leaders earned 3 tokens per slider (i.e., stage A of ET1 and ET2), the extra token was called a private token. Leaders were told that they would receive the private token as compensation for performing the slider task. In line with this, private tokens could not be given to the recipient.
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The next part of the experiment elicited social norms. Norms are generally defined as socially enforced rules with some degree of consensus that prescribe or proscribe certain actions and behaviors (Coleman, 1990; Elster, 1989; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Ostrom, 1990) . Our focus here is on injunctive social norms, or what one "should" or "should not" do (Elster, 1989) , as opposed to common customs or typical behaviors (i.e., descriptive norms). The present study is directly concerned with norms about giving-or the socially appropriate percentage of tokens leaders "should" transfer to recipients-in stage B of the game (i.e., when the piece-rate is 2 tokens per slider across all four conditions).
To measure norms, we draw on the approach developed by Krupka and Weber (2013) .
Paralleling their design, subjects were presented with a description of a choice environment that included common available actions. The actions were concerned with the allocation of 50 community tokens under 11 different hypothetical outcomes. Outcomes decreased for leaders (increased for recipients) by increments of 5 for each subsequent outcome starting at "Leader gets 50, Recipient gets 0" and ending at "Leader gets 0, Recipient gets 50", with "Leader gets 25, Recipient gets 25" set at the mid-point (see Krupka and Weber 2013 for an example instrument).
Subjects were then asked to judge the social appropriateness of each action on a four-point scale that ranged from "very socially inappropriate", "somewhat socially inappropriate", "somewhat socially appropriate", to "very socially appropriate". Subjects were provided with incentives not to reveal their own personal preferences but to match the responses of others, yielding a pure matching coordination game (Schelling, 1960; Mehta et al., 1994) . Subjects earned money if their evaluation of the social appropriateness of different allocations corresponded to the answer given by most others as well.
Incentivizing choices under different outcome conditions yields two distinct advantages. First, norms reflect some level of social consensus. Incentivized coordination games provide a way to identify these collective perceptions separate from individual preferences. Second, norms are conditional and vary in strength and polarity (Hechter and Opp, 2001 ). This means that norms are not necessarily binary classifications (e.g., "50-50 even split"). Instead, norms apply to an entire set of possible actions and will thus vary in the degree to which they are perceived as appropriate. The norm elicitation task, in other words, allows us to measure the level of social consensus about giving under different sets of conditions.
The last part of the experiment elicited demographic information from subjects and included questions about sex, age, nationality, and major field of study.
Hypotheses
In this section, we derive a set of hypotheses that guide our data analysis. It is apparent that selfish leaders, whose only goal is to maximize their own earnings, should keep all tokens for themselves. The literature offers different reasons why we may nonetheless observe some giving, such as altruism, fairness, or preferences for efficiency (Andreoni, 1990; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2008) . Indeed, Andreoni and Miller (2002) have shown that subjects' altruistic behavior is often in line with rationality or the existence of a well-behaved utility function that rationalizes subjects' choices across different situations.
To incorporate the possibility of preferences that go beyond pure payoff-maximization, we assume that a leader's utility depends on his or her own payoff as well as on the payoff of the recipient . In addition, we allow for reference-dependent preferences (see Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006) . That is, the utility derived from the current earnings potentially depends on some reference payoff, denoted by ̃. To sum up, the leaders' utility function takes the following form:
The reason we are interested in reference points is that they allow us to capture potential crowdingout effects regarding the leaders' willingness to give. The higher piece-rate of 3 in stage A of ET1
and ET2 tends to lead to high earnings, compared to stage B where the piece-rate is 2. If subjects use their earnings in stage A as a reference point, this will reduce giving relative to the behavior observed in stage B under conditions NET1 and NET2 (where the earnings in stage A are expected to be lower than in ET1 and ET2, respectively).
We next describe these effects formally, using a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The only modification to the standard case is that there is also a term that depends on the reference point ̃:
Notice that ∈ [0,1] is the weight the leader puts on the recipient's payoff. It can therefore be interpreted as the leader's level of altruism. Also, notice that the utility derived from is reduced if the earnings fall short of the reference point. Letting be the number of tokens generated in the real effort task, the budget constraint is = + (1/ ) , where is the multiplier. 6 The leader's optimal amount of giving follows from maximizing eq. 2, subject to the budget constraint.
We summarize the result in Observation 1.
Observation 1: Let = (1 − ) and = 1+ . The leader's optimal allocation of tokens is given by * = if >̃, * =̃ if ≤̃< 1− , and * = +̃ otherwise. It follows that the recipient's welfare * = ( − * ) is increasing in the total amount of tokens , the multiplier and the leader's level of altruism , and decreasing in the level of the reference point ̃.
Observation 1 shows that the reference point can affect leader giving in three ways: low levels of ̃ do not affect giving, for intermediate levels of ̃ the leader chooses to keep his earnings the same as in the previous period, and for high levels of ̃ the leader accepts some reduction in earnings between stages in order to accommodate his altruism. Observation 1 has immediate implications for the different experimental manipulations. First, giving increases in the amount of tokens the leader can distribute as long as > 0. Since a higher piece-rate is likely to result in a larger , the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 1: External transfers increase community welfare. That is, the recipients' earnings in stage A are greater in ET1 than NET1 and greater in ET2 than NET2.
Similarly, if the price of giving falls (i.e., the multiplier increases), the amount of tokens received by the recipient increases.
Hypothesis 2: Community welfare is greater in the public good condition than the wealth distribution condition. That is, recipients' earnings in stage A are greater in NET2 than NET1 and greater in ET2 than ET1.
As mentioned before, we do not expect large learning effects in the real-effort task across stages.
The amount of tokens generated in subsidy treatments ET1 and ET2 should thus be higher in stage A than stage B due to the higher piece-rate. The same does not apply to NET1 and NET2. In other words, if reference point effects exist, they will occur in the transition from stage A to stage B of subsidy treatments ET1 and ET2, but there will be no reference point effects in NET1 and NET2.
This leads to our last hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: External transfers reduce giving in the long-run. That is, the recipients' earnings in stage B is greater in NET1 than ET1 and greater in NET2 than ET2.
Notice that in the discussion so far reference points were modelled as monetary effects: leaders try to avoid a reduction in the amount of tokens earned relative to what they have experienced in the past. An alternative interpretation is that the private tokens earned in stage A of ET1 and ET2
reduce the intrinsic motivation to give (Meier, 2007) . Indeed, it is conceivable that leaders, on average, believe that the right thing to do is to give a share of the tokens to the recipient in NET1
and NET2, but that their intrinsic motivation to give in stage B is reduced once they have received an extra reward for performing the slider task in stage A of ET1 and ET2. We address this possibility in the discussion and conclusion.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the University of California, Berkeley's Experimental Social Science Laboratory (XLab) in February 2016. A total of 158 subjects participated in the experiment. We ran three sessions of NET1 and ET1, and four sessions of NET2 and ET2. Each session had between 8 and 12 participants. The number of subjects in the role of a leader (the number of independent observations) is 17 for NET1, 18 for ET1, 21 for NET2 and 23 for ET2.
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Participants were students from various disciplines at the University of California, Berkeley. The mean age was 20.5 years and 73 percent were female.
The experiment was implemented with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) . Written instructions were handed out for stage A of the experiment and were also read aloud by the experimenter, who was the first author. The experiment started after all participants had correctly answered a set of control questions handed out along with the instructions. The instructions for stage B (which were similar to the instructions for stage A) and the norm elicitation task were displayed on the computer screen in z-Tree. In the instructions for stage B, we highlighted the differences between stage A and stage B, which was either no difference or the removal of the private tokens (external transfer).
All instructions can be found on the authors' websites. A typical session lasted 45 minutes.
Earnings were given in experimental currency units (ECU) and converted into US Dollars at the end of the experiment (1 ECU = $0.20 USD). Subjects earned on average $18.30 USD, including a show up fee of $5 USD.
Results
We begin by presenting the results from stage A and stage B. Against this benchmark, we finish with a discussion of the norm elicitation task.
[ Insert Table 1 About Here ]
Regarding hypothesis 1, the difference in means between the external transfer (M = 12.05, SD = 9.98) and no external transfer (M = 8.47, SD = 7.58) conditions shows that subsidies increase giving (Δ M = 3.58). Yet, model 1 in Table 1 reveals this difference to be statistically insignificant at the p < .05 level (β = 3.58, SE = 2.01, p = .07). 8 Subsidies, therefore, do not seem to foster 7 During the first session of our study, the arrow keys were not disabled. This allowed 2 subjects in a NET1 condition to correctly align all 48 sliders. We exclude these 2 subjects from the present analysis. Alternative analyses suggest that their inclusion does not alter the present findings (results are available upon request). 8 Mann-Whitney U = -1.59, p = 0.11.
giving behavior (we will qualify this observation below). Regarding hypothesis 2, the difference in means between the multiplier × 1 (M = 10.18, SD = 8.26) and the multiplier × 2 (M = 10.52, SD = 9.71) conditions shows that giving is not greater in the public good condition than the wealth distribution condition (Δ M = 0.34). Model 1 in Table 1 shows that this effect is not statistically significant at the p < .05 level. 9 Therefore, the public good is underprovided. In other words, the fact that a good or service would substantially increase community welfare when provided does not imply that leaders are also more willing to do so.
[ Insert Table 2 About Here ]
So far, we have only discussed main effects of the subsidy (averaged across two multiplier conditions) and multiplier (averaged across two subsidy conditions). Yet, hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest complex interaction effects between subsidy and relative price of giving. To explore these effects, the average amount of giving from leaders to passive recipients for each of the four conditions-NET1, NET2, ET1, and ET2-is shown in Table 2 . What the decomposition shows is that the positive effect of subsidies on giving behavior is dependent on whether the relative price of giving is a wealth distribution (i.e., multiplier × 1) or public good (i.e., multiplier × 2) condition.
In fact, the mean difference in the average amount of tokens transferred between ET1 and NET1 is 0.09, while the mean difference between ET2 and NET2 is 6.19 (see Figure 2 ).
[ Insert Figure 2 About Here ] While model 2 in Table 1 suggests that the interaction between the subsidy and relative price of giving variables is statistically insignificant at the p < .05 level (β = 6.10, SE = 3.96, p = .12), our primary focus is on the marginal effects. As such, the marginal effects presented in Figure   3 show that these effects are statistically insignificant at the p < .05 level (external transfer: necessarily correlate with actual behavior. To state it differently, although we have established that subsidies do not undermine giving by leaders, it could be the case that subsidies instead shift norms about giving.
[ Insert Figure 5 About Here ]
Recall that subjects were asked to judge the social appropriateness of various shares of tokens on a four-point scale, ranging from "very socially inappropriate", "somewhat socially inappropriate", "somewhat socially appropriate", to "very socially appropriate" (N = 1606, M = 2.32, SD = 1.16, Min = 1, Max = 4). 14 Figure 5 reports the proportion of socially appropriate ratings selected for the leader's share of tokens pooled over the two roles (leaders and passive recipients) and four conditions (NET1, ET1, NET2, and ET2). Figure 5 shows that consensus (or at least majority opinion) dominates for some conditions. In particular, when the share of tokens for leaders is 0 or 50, the majority favors a socially inappropriate opinion with the bulk of ratings "very socially inappropriate". When the share of tokens for leaders is 25, 30, or 35, we see a similar level of consensus, but in the opposite direction (subjects found these values for the share of leader tokens to be the most socially appropriate). Where we observe the least consensus (or most divergent opinions) is with values in which leaders get some (10, 15, and 20) or most (40 and 45) of the tokens. In these situations, there appears to be polarized opinions regarding the socially appropriate share of tokens.
In Figure 6 , we decompose ratings of the leader's share of tokens by role (passive recipients found in Panel A, leaders found in Panel B) and condition (NET1, ET1, NET2, and ET2). Overall, the figure shows consistency of opinion regarding the appropriateness of a leader's share of tokens:
those shares that gravitate toward a 25-25 even split tend to be viewed as socially appropriate regardless of the role or condition, while those allocations that gravitate toward an all (50) or nothing (0) share of tokens tend to be viewed as socially inappropriate. Figure 6 , however, does suggest minor differences across roles and conditions. For instance, it appears as if larger leader shares are viewed as more socially appropriate in the multiplier × 2 condition (NET2 and ET2) than the multiplier × 1 condition (NET1 and ET1). Ordered logistic regression models with cluster-robust standard errors suggest that subsidies do not undermine or crowd-out norms about 14 In one session, no data on norms were collected since the two stages took longer than expected. To stay in the advertised timeframe, the norm elicitation was skipped.
giving or that the undermining effect of subsidies is conditional on the relative price of giving (see Appendix C).
[ Insert Figure 6 About Here ]
Finally, even though we observe consensus amongst leaders and passive recipients about socially (in)appropriate shares of tokens, revealed behavior across two stages of the dictator game did not parallel norms measured in our norm elicitation task. More specifically, the proportion of tokens leaders kept in stage A was .76 (min = 0, max = 1) and .82 in stage B (min = 0, max = 1) with 1.0 (i.e., no tokens transferred) the most common distribution of tokens by leaders (see Figure   7 ). This share of tokens is equivalent to a 40-10 split in the norm elicitation task (Leader gets 40, Recipient gets 10), which is generally viewed as socially inappropriate albeit with some divergence of opinion (see Figure 5 ). Norms, in other words, do not appear to determine actual giving. Most [ Insert Figure 7 About Here ]
Conclusion
Economists and political scientists have struggled for decades to identify the specific impact and overall efficacy of foreign aid on developing countries. Streams of research from multiple disciplines deliver varied results. Some research, for instance, advocates positive effects of foreign aid on economic, social, and political development, while other research suggests negative or null effects. Although scientists have yet to reach a consensus regarding the overall impact of foreign aid, most researchers agree that causal identification is a central concern and that more work is required to better understand if and how foreign aid delivered to non-state actors influences local communities in developing nations.
The present paper employs a research design-controlled laboratory experimentationthat appropriately controls for endogeneity issues by causally identifying the effects of foreign aid on local institutions. We operationalize foreign aid as a specific type-external piece-rate subsidies-and explore rates of giving among undergraduate students who play a version of the dictator game with a real-effort task. We vary the size of the subsidy and relative price of giving across two rounds of play, and measure norms about giving with a hypothetical norm elicitation task. We thus operationalize local institutions as rates of giving and social norms. It is found that subsidizing wealth distribution does not increase benefits for community members, but that subsidizing public good provision does: the benefits of a subsidy are effectively passed on to community members through greater sharing by community leaders. Yet, in the absence of a subsidy, we find no difference between the relative price of giving conditions in terms of community welfare or overall efficiency -a result suggesting how essential subsidies are to uncovering the welfare-enhancing effects of public good provision. We also find that subsidies do not undermine community welfare or norms about giving in the long-term: the introduction and then removal of a subsidy does not alter or change the behavior of community leaders or norms about socially appropriate amounts of giving.
Our findings speak to multiple (sometimes competing) literatures. First, we do not find our results directly at odds with either literature suggesting a positive or negative effect of foreign aid on local institutions. One key finding from our experiment is that foreign aid operationalized as private piece-rate transfers might contribute to income inequality: community leaders are unlikely to distribute unconditional private transfers to community members, thereby restricting the benefits of external subsidies to community leaders and local elites (Olken, 2007; Reinikka and Svensson, 2000) . While this result parallels observational research (Bjørnskov, 2010; Boone, 1996; Chong et al., 2009) , we find that the contribution of foreign aid to inequality is conditional on the relative price of giving. If leaders face conditions conducive to the provision of public goods, then leaders will effectively transfer external subsidies to community members (Gomanee et al., 2005; Osei et al., 2005) . This result is particularly important in light of recent research illustrating how transfers of wealth are a boon to local economies and the overall psychological well-being of recipients (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016) .
Second, another key finding from our experiment is that the introduction and then removal of an external subsidy does not crowd-out or undermine giving. Leaders, in other words, do not take more from community members in order to compensate for the volatility of subsidies. This finding is directly at odds with observational research: the literature on foreign aid shocks is nearly unanimous in showing that aid volatility carries with it severe negative consequences (Agenor and Aizenman, 2010; Eifert and Gelb, 2005; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000; Nielson et al., 2011) . Our results also imply that neither a shift in reference points (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006 ) nor a decline in intrinsic motivations (Frey and Jegen, 2001 ) follows from the removal of an external subsidy (if we assume that the behavior observed captures intrinsic motivations). On top of this, social norms about giving are strikingly similar across the various conditions. Overall, external subsidies do not weaken preferences for or norms about giving in the long-term.
How are we to reconcile these findings? In two important respects. First, our effects should be viewed as localized and circumscribed. To put it differently, we explore specific outcomesgiving behavior and norms about giving-at the expense of a wide-range of possible outcomes.
We did so to reduce design complexity, to leverage causal identification, and to investigate outcomes commonly found in local communities. Recall the scope of our study: we strictly focused on decision making by leaders and not on whether or how passive recipients-whose actions were limited and constrained-responded to the behavior of leaders (i.e., as in a proper game). Given findings from observational research, freeing this constraint could lead to conflict between leaders and recipients that might ultimately degrade local economies and institutions (see Nielson et al., 2011) . The implication is that aid may act as a key source of conflict and struggle over redistribution, which could impact other social, economic, or political outcomes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Morrison, 2007; Steinwand, 2014) . Alternatively, our finding that leaders do not alter their giving behavior in reaction to the removal of a subsidy might suggest that intrastate conflict produced by foreign aid shocks results not from changes in leader behavior but from a reduction in the goods and services foreign aid subsidizes (see Agenor and Aizenman, 2010; Eifert and Gelb, 2005; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000) . Regardless of the interpretation, future lab experiments would do well to move beyond decision-theory-based experiments to game theoretic experiments that investigate the role of active (as opposed to passive) recipients on community welfare and the behavior of leaders.
Second, a common finding in economics, political science, and sociology is that incentives designed to promote pro-social behavior, such as giving, are sometimes counterproductive to the extent that these incentives counterintuitively crowd-out social preferences, social norms, or intrinsic motivations (Frey and Jegen, 2001 ). On second glance, our findings are in line with this research. Recent surveys of the literature suggest that incentives can promote (crowd-in) social preferences and social norms depending on the conditions (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012) : (1) when an incentive provides information about the principal's intentions or type (administering rewards instead of fines), it may trigger the target's social preferences to align with the incentive (in this case, a reward), and (2) when an incentive frames decision situations and provides cues about appropriate behavior, social preferences and giving behavior may align with the frame. In relation to the present study, our incentive constitutes a private reward for performing a given task.
And our design is conducive to giving in that the experimental situation frames roles as leaders and recipients and tokens as community tokens. Both of which parallel conditions conducive to "crowding in".
A remaining question is how to interpret the external validity of our results. One outstanding critique of laboratory experiments is the extent to which behavior observed in the lab generalizes to other populations, settings, or situations (Levitt and List, 2007) . Some findings in the lab, for instance, are observed only in highly controlled experimental contexts and rarely (if ever) observed in natural settings or the wild. Research on strong reciprocity is a prime example (Guala, 2012) . While we generally agree with these critiques, lab experiments are best used in direct reference to (i.e., testing of) general theory or in relation to prior non-experimental research.
Both of which drove the present design: adjudicate between competing models of foreign aid and the mixed results found in development economics with the "gold standard" method of causal identification. Our results then are best interpreted in light of prior observational studies with high external validity. Regardless, we firmly believe that future research should be done using field experiments and lab-in-the-field experiments that strengthen external validity with slight reductions to internal validity.
To conclude, political and economic leaders can benefit their community through a range of behaviors including the redistribution of wealth and the provision of public goods. Most leaders in developing countries, however, often fail to accomplish these basic tasks. When foreign governments and non-governmental organizations wish to encourage benevolence and giving amongst local leaders, external actors must decide whether to subsidize local community leaders and what sort of leader behaviors to target. Our results suggest that external actors would do well to subsidize specific types of leader behavior, and that the removal of external cash transfers will not reduce overall community welfare or alter local norms. Notes: The manipulations are subsidy (i.e., piece-rate of 2 or 3) and relative price of giving (i.e., multiplier × 1 or × 2). We used a 2 × 2 factorial design varying the piece-rate in stage A and the multiplier (in both stages). Table 1 (results available upon request).
Taken together, the analysis presented in Appendix A shows that neither the amount nor the proportion of tokens transferred from leaders to passive recipients was not a function of effort (i.e., the number of correctly positioned sliders) in the real-effort task. Wald χ² χ² (2) = 5.46 χ² (3) = 11.17 χ² (2) = 4.13 χ² (3) = 5.01 p = .07 p = .01 p = .13 p = .17 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed) Note: unstandardized slopes (bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, 5000 replications). The outcome is the number of correctly positioned sliders. The reference category for subsidy is piece-rate of 2. The reference category for relative price of giving is multiplier × 1. F-test F(3, 76) = 14.54 F(7, 76) = 6.75 p < .001 p < .001 *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed) Note: unstandardized slopes (cluster-robust standard errors). The outcome is the number of correctly positioned sliders. The reference category for subsidy is piece-rate of 2. The reference category for relative price of giving is multiplier × 1. The reference category for stage is stage A.
Appendix C
In Table C1 , we estimate ordered logistic regression models with cluster-robust standard errors. In these models, we regress ratings of socially appropriate shares of tokens on dummy variables for leader's share of tokens, role (leader versus passive recipient), subsidy (piece-rate of 2 versus 3), relative price of giving (multiplier × 1 versus × 2), and various multiplicative interaction terms. Model 1 in Table C1 explores the effect of leader's share of tokens on ratings, which shows that there was a statistically significant effect of shares of tokens on ratings of social appropriateness at the p < .05 level (χ 2 [10] = 290.72, p < .001). Post hoc comparisons and predicted probabilities illustrated in Figure C1 parallel the proportion of socially appropriate ratings found in Figure 5 . In fact, all predicted probabilities presented in Figure C1 are statistically different from zero.
In model 2, we include main effects for role, subsidy, and relative price of giving. To summarize, it appears as if subsidies do not undermine or crowd-out norms about giving or that the undermining effect of subsidies is conditional on the relative price of giving.
1 Figure C1 . Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals of ratings of socially appropriate shares of tokens Notes: Points at which the upper and lower bounds of a confidence interval are above (or below) the dashed horizontal zero line indicate a statistically significant marginal effect. Probabilities are predicted based on ordered logistic regression coefficients in model 1, Table C1 .
